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INTRODUCTION

According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) there are
approximately 168 million child laborers in the world. 1 Despite the
overall decline in child labor, the ILO estimates that the decline in child
labor has been slowing. 2 Many of these children are victims of modem
slavery. 3 Modem slavery takes many different forms, including forced
labor. 4 In 2012, the ILO estimated that 20.9 million people were
victims of forced labor globally. 5 Of these, twenty-six percent, or 5.5
million, fell under the age of 18. 6
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), a federal statute of the United
States, has emerged as a potentially powerful tool in the effort to
combat child labor globally. The statute grants federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction over claims arising from torts committed against
non-U.S. nationals in violation of international law. 7 Since the 1980s,
human rights activists and victims of human rights violations have
brought ATS claims in the U.S. against the perpetrators of human rights
violations. 8 Recently, a number of such claims have been brought on
behalf of children who argue that international law has been violated by
virtue of their subjection to labor constituting slavery or forced labor.
This paper argues that both the enslavement and forced labor of
children constitute violations of customary international law, for which
the ATS provides a civil remedy. The paper first introduces the ATS.
It then explores how U.S. federal courts have treated slavery, forced
labor, and child labor claims under the statute. Thereafter, it reviews
the practice of States and the relevant sources of international law and
argues that there is a norm of international law prohibiting slavery and
forced labor generally, as well as the enslavement and forced labor of
children. Lastly, it argues that the unique status of children within the
1. ILO, !LO Says Global Number of Child Labourers Down by a Third since 2000,
INTERNATIONAL
LABOR
ORGANIZATION
(Sept.
23,
2013),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS _ 221568/langen/index.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
2. Id.
3. ILO, SPECIAL ACTION PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, ILO GLOBAL
ESTIMATE
OF
FORCED
LABOR
14
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/- ed_norm/- declaration/documents/publication/wcms_l82004.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
4.
ILO, Forced Labor, available at http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forcedlabour/lang----en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
5. PROGRAMME TO COMBAT FORCED LABOR, supra note 3, at 13.
6. Id. at 14.
7. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012).
8. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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law of nations merits a special analysis of the elements of forced labor,
specifically because of children's status within the international
community as persons in need of protection. Under international law,
not only is children's ability to assert their rights different from that of
their adult counterparts, but also children possess limited capacity to
consent to certain types of labor, dependent largely on their age and the
conditions of labor.
II. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The Alien Tort Statute provides federal courts with "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations." 9 While the First Congress passed the
statute within the Judiciary Act of 1789, it was invoked as the basis for
a court's jurisdiction in only one case in over 170 years. 10 This changed
in 1980 when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided Filartiga v.
Pefia-lrala. 11 Reversing the district court's determination that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, the Second Circuit held that the Alien Tort
Statute provided the district court with jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
wrongful death claim. The Court held that the Paraguayan plaintiffs
successfully alleged conduct that violated a norm of international law,
namely the Paraguayan defendant's torture of their relative. 12 There, the
Court determined that "[ a]mong the rights universally proclaimed by all
nations ... is the right to be free of physical torture." 13
Following Filartiga, the Supreme Court held that while the ATS is
a jurisdictional statute, 14 the substantive law governing A TS claims
should be derived from the law of nations because "international law is
a part of our [federal] law." 15 Further, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Court held that federal courts possess limited discretion to recognize
norms of international law. 16 However the Court emphasized that lower
courts should restrain their discretion in identifying previously
unrecognized violations of the law of nations. Nevertheless, since
Filartiga, the A TS has become an important tool for human rights law,
and federal courts now entertain suits by non-nationals against civil

9. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012).
10. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004).
11. See generally Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
12. Id. at 890.
13. Id.
14. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 694.
15. Id. at 730 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
16. Id. at 73 l.
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rights abusers for certain violations of human rights. 17
Significantly, in Filartiga the Court recognized the potential for
the change and evolution of customary international law over time. 18 In
fact, it identified human rights law as a primary example of this: "In the
modem age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined
to lead the nations of the world to recognize that respect for
fundamental human rights is in their individual and collective
interest." 19 Federal courts have been fairly uniform in finding that the
law of nations evolves over time. 2 Furthermore, in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, the Supreme Court endorsed this interpretation by recognizing
claims brought for violations of the ''present-day law of nations." 1
Last year, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, the
Supreme Court limited the applicability of the ATS over certain
claims. 22 After noting that "there is no indication that the ATS was
passed to make the United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the
enforcement of international norms," the Court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS claims. 23
Yet Kiobel 's effect on ATS litigation is far from clear, and the
decision "[wa]s careful to leave open a number of significant questions
regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]." 24 Clearly, Kiobel
restricts ATS's applicability to so-called "F-cubed [ATS] actions,"
actions involving non-U.S. foreigners suing a foreign defendant based

°

17. Virginia Monken Gomez, The Sosa Standard: What Does It Mean for Future ATS
Litigation?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 469, 470 (2006).
18. Filartiga , 630 F.2d at 890.
19. Id.; but see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J. concurring).
20. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 165 (5th Cir. 1999);
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889; Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal.
1987).
21. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (emphasis added).
22. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 U.S. 1659, 1669 (2013). The
presumption against extraterritoriality "is a longstanding principle of American law 'that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). Therefore, '"unless
there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed' to give a statute
extraterritorial effect, '[the Court] must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic
conditions."' Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) (quoting
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. at 248).
23. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669.
24. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Similarly, in a separate concurrence, Judge
Alito suggested that the decision "obviously leaves much unanswered, and perhaps there is
wisdom in the Court's preference for this narrow approach." Id. at 1669-70.
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on conduct that occurred outside of the U.S. 25 Yet where the plaintiff
or defendant is a U.S. citizen or where the conduct that gave rise to the
claim occurred within the U.S., Kiobel will not affect ATS's
applicability. 26 Further, ATS will apply to a claim even when "all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States . . . [where] the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States with
sufficient force to displace the presumption. " 27

A. Identifying Norms of Customary International Law
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court established the
standard used to identify a norm of customary international law, the
violation of which gives rise to an actionable claim under the A TS. The
standard requires "any claim based on the present-day law of nations to
rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized
world."28 Further, the norm must be "defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [the Supreme
Court has] recognized." 29 Elaborating on this latter requirement, claims
cannot rely on "violations of any international law norm with less
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the
historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted [in 1789]."30 In
considering whether a particular norm is sufficiently definite to give rise
to a cause of action, a court determination "should (and, indeed,
inevitably must) involve an element of judgment about the practical
consequences of making that cause available to litigants. " 31
Despite the Supreme Court's enunciation of a standard by which to
identify norms of customary international law, lower courts'
interpretation of the standard lack uniformity. They have produced a
number of discrete tests regarding the identification of international
norms. The most frequently-utilized standard requires norms to be
sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory.
Additionally, the
Second Circuit requires that norms constitute "rules that States
universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and
mutual concern. " 32
25. Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 171, 178 (2013).
26. Id. at 186.
27. Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669; see also Winkler, supra note 25, at 188.
28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 732.
31. Id. at 732-33.
32. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 248 (2d Cir. 2003).
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The interpretation of the sufficiently specific, universal, and
obligatory standard varies widely among circuits. For instance, the
Seventh Circuit interprets the standard broadly, arguing that the
standard "like so many statements of legal doctrine . . . is suggestive
rather than precise; taken literally it could easily be refuted. No norms
are truly 'universal'; 'universal' is inconsistent with 'accepted by the
civilized world'; 'obligatory' is the conclusion not the premise; and
some of the most widely accepted international norms are vague, such
as 'genocide' and 'torture. "' 33 Despite its broad interpretation, which
on its face undercuts the standard's effectiveness in limiting the number
of norms giving rise to actionable ATS claims, the Seventh Circuit
purports to employ this standard.
By contrast, at the extreme, some courts have incorporated a
"lowest common denominator approach" into the specific, universal,
and obligatory standard. 34 In Doe v. Nestle, the District Court applied
the standard, suggesting, "where there are a variety of formulations [for
an international norm], the court should look to the formulation that is
agreed upon by all-a lowest common denominator or common 'core
definition' of the norm. " 35 This is probably the highest standard applied
in determining whether a norm under the law of nations exists 36 and a
misinterpretation of Sosa.

B. Sources ofInternational Law
To determine whether a plaintiff properly alleged a violation of the
law of nations, courts must review sources of international law. The
United Nations enumerated the sources of international law in Article

33. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber, Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011); see
also Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc'y, 860 F. Supp. 2d 1216,
1229 (W.D. Wash. 2012), for a different interpretation of this standard.
34. See Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also In re S.
African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Another reason for
mentioning this standard is that Doe is one of the four cases reviewed about domestic
courts' treatment of forced child labor claims under the ATS. Id.
35. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1080; see also In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). These cases both cite to Justice Katzmann's concurrence in
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 264 (2d Cir. 2007), in which he
interpreted Sosa to require a "discemable core definition that commands the same level of
consensus as the 18th-century crimes identified by the Supreme Court." Interestingly,
Justice Katzmann in applying this standard held that a norm of aiding and abetting liability
under the law of nations exists. Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (J. Katzmann, concurring). In
Doe, the majority came to the opposite conclusion by applying its lowest common
denominator standard.
36. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (J. Katzmann, concurring); Nestle, 748 F. Supp.
2d at 1080.
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38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: (1) general and
particular international conventions; (2) international custom; (3)
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and, as a
subsidiary source, (4) the works of the most qualified publicists. 37
Domestic courts in the U.S. have made reference to Article 38 in
determining the sources of international law to which they should
refer. 38 They have also cited the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law § 102, 39 which defines customary international law as law
"result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation."40
In The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court enumerated the
sources to which courts should refer to identify a norm under the law of
nations:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty and no controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to
the works of jurists and commentators who by years of labor, research,
and experience have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with
the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really
·

lS.

41

Specifically, the Court in The Paquete Habana, reviewed States'
historical practice, 42 States' contemporary practice, historical treaties,
opinion of international tribunals, and the works of jurists regarding the
wartime capture of unarmed fishing vessels from ancient to
contemporary times. 43
Although all international treaties provide some evidence of the
custom and practice of nations, "a treaty will only constitute sufficient
proof of a norm of customary international law if an overwhelming

37. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1) 33 U.N.T.S.
993. While the ICJ refers to customary international law as just one source of international
law, readers of U.S. court opinions should be wary because some have used the term
"customary international law" as a synonym for the "law of nations" in ATS cases. See, e.g.
Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 876.
38. See, e.g., Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 399 (4th Cir. 2011); Kiobel, 621 F.3d
at 132; see also Filartiga, 630 F. 2d at 876.
39. See, e.g., Karadzic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 102 (1987).
41. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
42. See id. at 697 (considering evidence not only of affirmative State practice, but also
the practice's historical condemnation).
43. Id. at 686-700.
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majority of States have ratified the treaty, and those States uniformly
and consistently act in accordance with its principles." 44 The U.S.'
failure to ratify conventions does not preclude their use as evidence of
the law of nations. 45 Indeed, in certain circumstances conventions not
ratified by the U.S. may not only be used as evidence of the law of
nations, but also may be evidence of a norm binding upon the U.S. 46
Material sources of international law are afforded different weight
depending upon the degree to which they evidence the existence of a
consensus among States. 47 Thus, a treaty may be afforded greater
48
weight depending on the number of States that have ratified it.
Further, certain weight is afforded to non-binding material sources of
international law, such as unratified treaties or Declarations because,
although they lack binding force, they evidence the existence of a
consensus among States. 49
The analysis to determine whether a custom exists under
international law, as exemplified by The Paquete Habana, must be a
fact-specific, as well as a historically and legally intensive, process.
Despite the practical difficulties that such an application poses for
courts, Filartiga and its successors continually re-engaged the federal
courts in the task of recognizing norms of customary international law
grounded in human rights law. 50
III. DOMESTIC COURTS' APPLICATION OF THE SOSA
STANDARD TO ATS LABOR CLAIMS
This section will review the variety of treatments that domestic
courts have afforded to plaintiffs who argue that defendants violated the
law of nations by engaging in slavery, forced labor, and child labor.
Courts seem more willing to identify a norm of customary international
law prohibiting slavery or forced labor, than a norm prohibiting child
labor generally. 51 Despite reluctance to identify a norm of international
44. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137.
45. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 180 (2d Cir. 2009).
46. See, e.g. id. at 180-81. In Abdullahi v. Pfizer, the court found that conducting
medical experimentation on humans without their consent violated a norm of international
law, despite the United States' failure to ratify a relevant convention. Id.
47. JAMES CRAWFORD, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (8th ed. 2012).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Kathleen M. Kedian, Customary International Law and International Human

Rights Litigation in United States Courts: Revitalizing the Legacy of the Paquete Habana,
40 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1395, 1400 (1999).
51. Compare Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1023 (7th Cir.
2011) (refusing to recognize that a norm exists prohibiting the employing of children in
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law with regard to all child labor, after applying the Sosa standard to
child labor, two courts have indicated that under certain facts, especially
where an employer subjected children to slavery or forced labor,
plaintiffs' claims should be actionable under the ATS. 52
Therefore, domestic courts seem receptive to recognizing a norm
of international law prohibiting the enslavement and forced labor of
children under the appropriate facts. Yet in practice, primarily because
of procedural obstacles and secondarily due to the reluctance of courts
to recognize norms of the law of nations, plaintiffs bringing ATS claims
based on child labor have largely been unsuccessful. 53
While this should not deter prospective plaintiffs, their arguments
should be structured to demonstrate that their claims are based on
conduct that rises to the level of either traditional notions of slavery or
more modem conceptions of forced labor. Yet this does not mean that
child laborers' causes of action based on slavery or forced labor should
be treated as equal to those claims brought by their adult counterparts.
Instead, courts must consider claims in conjunction with children's
unique status within the international community, specifically as
persons in need of protection. In particular, courts should pay special
attention to how this status affects children's ability to consent and
assert their rights within various forms and conditions of labor.
This section first reviews domestic courts' treatment of A TS
claims based on slavery and forced labor and continues by reviewing
the treatment of child labor claims. It then argues that a norm of
customary international law exists prohibiting child labor that is
tantamount to slavery and forced labor, and that such conduct is
therefore actionable under the ATS.

A. Treatment ofATS Claims Based on Slavery and Forced Labor
Domestic courts generally recognize that slavery violates the law
of nations. Even in cases where slavery is not directly at issue, courts
routinely refer to slavery as one of the few norms that clearly violates

work that is harmful to their health, safety, or morals), and Doe Iv. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d
932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002) on reh 'gen bane sub nom. John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that forced labor is so widely condemned that it has surpassed
being merely a norm of customary law and has attained the status of ajus cogens violation);
see also infra sections A and B. While Unocal's decision was vacated, it was only vacated
after the plaintiffs and Unocal settled the case for an undisclosed amount. Ron A. Ghatan,
Note: The Alien Tort Statute and Prudential Exhaustion, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1273, 1276
(2011).
52. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075; Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023.
53. See infra Treatment ofATS Claims Based on Child Labor, at section B.
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customary international law. 54
Further, some courts have also
recognized that forced labor may be actionable as a violation of
customary international law under the ATS. 55
While ultimately rejecting a plaintiffs claim, in Velez v. Sanchez,
the Second Circuit, noted that slavery "in which one human being
purports to own another" violates the law of nations. 56 There, it asserted
that of the norms of customary international law, the prohibition of
slavery is "one of the most well-established." 57 The Court opined that
over time the norm prohibiting slavery has evolved to include a variety
of its modem forms, including forced labor and servitude. 58 Other
courts have similarly found that forced labor constitutes a violation of
customary international law. 59
In fact, in Unocal the Ninth Circuit went further and held both that
slavery and forced labor were }us cogens violations. 60 Additionally,
while the Ninth Circuit strictly limits the norms of international law that
may be asserted against private individuals, in Unocal it opined that
"forced labor, like traditional variants of slave trading, is among the
'handful of crimes ... to which the law of nations attributes individual
liability,' such that state action is not required." 61

B. Treatment ofATS Claims Based on Child Labor
This author found four cases in which plaintiffs alleged a violation
of the law of nations based on the defendant's employment of
children. 62 Of them, two were dismissed on procedural grounds. 63 In
this section, an analysis of these cases is presented to demonstrate some
of the procedural difficulties that A TS plaintiffs face, as well as to
acquaint the reader with the wide variety of factual scenarios that have

54. See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)).
55. See, e.g., Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946.
56. Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 319 (2d Cir. 2012).
57. Velez, 693 F .3d at 319 (citing Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery
and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary
International Law, 39 VA. J. INT' LL. 303, 310 ( 1999)).
58. Velez, 693 F.3d at 319.
59. See Adhikari, 697 F. Supp. 2d at 685; Licea v. Curacao Drydock Co., 584 F. Supp.
2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. at 891-92.
60. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946.
61. Id. at 946.
62. Specifically, these are: Mother Doe Iv. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 113234 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 2011 WL 1085325 (S.D.N.Y.
201 l); Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
63. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134; Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325.
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given rise to ATS claims. In the remaining two cases, the court reached
a substantive analysis of whether plaintiffs properly alleged a violation
of the law of nations under Sosa. 64

1. Child Labor Claims Dismissed on Procedural Grounds
This section briefly recounts some of the procedural difficulties
faced by plaintiffs who have sought to recover under the A TS based on
a theory that child labor violates the law of nations. It suggests that
meeting the Sosa standard is but one obstacle for plaintiffs bringing
such claims.
In Ellul v. Christian Brothers, plaintiffs brought a claim under the
ATS in which they alleged a number of violations of customary
international law, including the forced labor of children. 65 There
claimants alleged that beginning in the 1940s and continuing for
decades, a program created by the Australian government took children
from the United Kingdom and Malta and moved them to orphanages
and work camps in Australia. 66 Thereafter, the children "were treated
shamelessly, abused, and neglected, subjected to forced labor, and
denied education. " 67 In 2011, three of the children, then adults, brought
suit under the ATS. 68
The Court dismissed their claims on a number of procedural
grounds, including the tolling of the statute of limitations. 69 Firstly, the
Court dismissed the claim because it lacked jurisdiction over both
defendants. 70 The plaintiffs' complaint named the wrong association of
Christian Brothers and failed to complete service on the correct
association. 71 Further, the plaintiffs named the Christian Brothers of
Rome, but failed to provide evidence that the Christian Brothers
Oceania, against whom they alleged violations of customary
international law, was acting under the control or authority of the
Christian Brothers of Rome. 72 The plaintiffs also sued the Order of the
Sisters of Mercy. 73 The court dismissed the allegations against this
defendant because it found that "it is not an organization with a
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 946.
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *1, 3-4.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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structure and purpose to act as an entity... [and] the common purpose
to which Plaintiffs point-charity-is too vague to unify these regional
organizations into a single legal entity." 74
The dismissal of these two defendants exemplifies one of the
difficulties faced by ATS plaintiffs, namely a failure to obtain personal
jurisdiction over defendants, a difficulty which presumably was the
reason that suit was not brought directly against Christian Brothers
Oceania. Further, in rare circumstances, plaintiffs may seek to recover
from organizations such as the Order of the Sisters of Mercy that are not
legally cognizable in the U.S.
Secondly, the Court dismissed the claim for the expiration of the
statute of limitations. The A TS has no express statute of limitations, but
courts have borrowed a ten-year statute of limitations from the Torture
Victim Protection Act. 75 Despite this, for certain claims, courts apply
equitable tolling. 76 Yet, in Ellul, the court noted that equitable tolling
"is appropriate only in rare and exceptional cases, in which a party is
'prevented in some extraordinary way from exercising [its] rights. "' 77
Further, the court held that because plaintiffs were aware of the factual
basis for their cause of action equitable tolling was inappropriate.
In Doe v. Al Maktoum, the Court dismissed a claim brought against
the Finance Minister of the United Arab Emirates and other unnamed
defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. 78 There, plaintiffs alleged
that defendants engaged in a number of violations of customary
international law, including forced child labor. 79 The plaintiffs, former
child jockeys, alleged that defendants kidnapped, trafficked, and
enslaved young boys from South Asia and Africa. 8° Further, they
alleged that at various times the children were "starved, deprived of
sleep, injected with hormones to [halt] grow[th], and sexually abused"
by the defendants. 81
The Court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that it had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because plaintiffs relied on the
affidavit of a researcher who relied on hearsay websites and newspaper
stories about the defendant's ownership of personal property in the U.S.,

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id.
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *3.
See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 491 (6th Cir. 2009).
Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325 at *3.
Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
Id.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1133-34.
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his purchase of race horses in Kentucky, and infrequent visits. 82 The
court held that his contacts were not sufficient under the Kentucky longarm statute because of an absence of substantial, continuous, and
systematic contacts with the forum. 83

2. Child Labor Claims Dismissed for Failure to Allege a
Violation of the Law ofNations
Two courts have analyzed the question of whether child labor
constitutes a violation of the law of nations. 84 Yet in only one case,
Flomo v. Firestone, has a court engaged in a detailed and substantive
analysis of the question. This section explores those cases.
In Doe v. Nestle, the Court opined that "it is clear that in some
instances 'child labor' constitute[s] a violation of an international norm
that is specific, universal, and well-defined." 85 Yet it dismissed the
claim on other grounds 86 and exerted little effort to backup this claim.
Citing to John Roe I v. Bridgestone, 87 the Court noted it would be
difficult to distinguish between instances of child labor that violate
customary international law and those that do not.
In Flomo v. Firestone, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed whether child labor constitutes a violation of customary
international law and, affirming the District Court's holding, found that
it did not. Flo mo, a procedurally complicated case, 88 exemplified not
only the procedural difficulties facing ATS claimants, but also the
difficulty of establishing a violation under Sosa. 89

82. Id. at 1141-43.
83. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
84. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
85. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
86. There, the court ultimately held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that an
international norm existed for aiding and abetting liability. To establish their claim against
Nestle, the plaintiffs relied on an aiding and abetting theory. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at
1057. Yet not all courts reject such claims. In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit held that ATS
claims could rely on such a theory. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d at 947-53. In Nestle, plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants knew or should have known of the child labor because of their
first hand knowledge and by the "numerous, well-documented reports of child labor" by
governmental and non-governmental actors. Their argument followed that despite their
knowledge, defendants not only purchased the cocoa from the farms, but also provided the
farms with resources "knowing that their assistance would necessarily facilitate child labor."
FAC 152; Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1066, 1075.
87. John Roe Iv. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
88. See Jessica Bergman, The Alien Tort Statute and Flomo v. Firestone Natural
Rubber Company: The Key to Change in Global Child Labor Practices?, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 455, 479 n.8 (2011).
89. Id.
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In Flomo, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated
customary international law when they employed children in
circumstances constituting "the worst forms of child labor. " 90 By the
time their claim was analyzed by the Circuit Court, the plaintiffs'
allegations of slavery and forced labor had been dismissed. 91 The
plaintiffs, who worked on rubber plantations in Liberia, alleged that the
defendant economically coerced children into working full time by
setting their fathers' daily quota of trees to tap so high that the fathers
had to recruit their children to work with them in order to retain their
jobs. Further, plaintiffs alleged that defendants imposed the quota
knowing it could be met only "if children join[ed] their fathers ... and
work[ed] from dawn to dusk." 92
The complaint detailed the alleged work in which children
engaged. These allegations included that plaintiffs began working at
4:30 a.m. by cleaning 1,500 tapper cups; that they tapped trees with
sharp tools facing the risk of blinding from raw latex; applied dangerous
chemical fertilizers to the rubber trees; and carried two 75-pound
buckets of latex at a time in order to be paid with their family's daily
food allotment. 93
It should be noted that, for the purposes of litigation under the
ATS, the facts presented do not make this an ideal test case. First,
Firestone did not directly employ the children. Instead, plaintiffs
claimed Firestone coerced children into working and "actively
encouraged [child labor]." 94 Secondly, this is not a case of direct
liability, but instead relies on a theory of agency liability. The fathers'
direct employer, Firestone Liberia, was a subsidiary of the defendant in
this case, Firestone National Rubber Company (FNRC). 95 After several
challenges early in the litigation, plaintiffs limited their theory of

90. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023.
91. Id.
92. Brief for Petitioner at 4, John Roe I, et al. v. Bridgestone Corp., 2005 CV05available
at
8168JFW,
http://iradvocates.mayfirst.org/sites/default/files/11.17.05%20Complaint.pdf (last visited
Feb. 4, 2014).
93. Id. One of the organizations that brought the suit on behalf of the plaintiffs,
International Rights Advocates, provides videos of the children and of the Firestone
Plantation. StopFirestone, Firestone & Child Labor in Liberia, YouTUBE (May 29, 2008),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FfzvdWqVIGk (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
For images, see Stop Firestone, INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS FORUM, available at
http://www.laborrights.org/stop-child-labor/stop-firestone (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
94. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 92, at 4.
95. Bergman, supra note 88.
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liability to FNRC. 96
Despite these legal obstacles, the attorneys were probably
influenced to bring the case by the great flurry of international attention
directed at the situation of Liberian workers on rubber plantations in
Liberia. 97 Following months of national and international scrutiny
directed toward the status of human rights on Liberian rubber
plantations, the Human Rights and Protection Section of the United
Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) released a report detailing the
situation. 98 This report set rubber plantations as a priority for United
Nations Missions in Liberia because "[i]n the context of Liberia's postconflict rehabilitation, the situation . . . [they] presented significant
security, political, economic and human rights challenges for the
Government which have not yet been resolved." 99 Further, the report
noted that "working conditions on the plantations violate fundamental
human rights standards. The situation is particular [sic] poor in relation
to child [sic]; child labor is indirectly encouraged by work practices and
lack of access to education." 100
In Flomo, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of
defendant's motion for summary judgment, but the Court conducted its
own Sosa analysis to determine that no norm of customary international
law prohibited child labor. 101 Yet prior to announcing its holding, the
Seventh Circuit expressed disquiet over the use of customary
international law as a means to recover under the ATS. 102
96. Id.
97. See U.N. Mission in Liberia, HUMAN RIGHTS IN LIBERIA'S RUBBER PLANTATIONS:
TAPPING
INTO
THE
FUTURE
(2006),
available
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/473dade10.html (last visited
Jan.
28,
2014)
[hereinafter UNMIL]. Firestone's Liberian plantation is huge, and its website stated that it
has more than 6,500 employees in Liberia. Resources, FAQs, FIRESTONE NATURAL RUBBER
COMPANY, available at http://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com/faqs.htm#l (last visited Jan.
28, 2014).
98. UNMIL, supra note 97, at 5.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1016.
102. Id. Its argument was as follows: Its reluctance originated from problems with
notice and legitimacy. In particular, the court opined that notice was a problem because
norms created by custom cannot be identified as clearly as those specifically identified by a
legal text. Further, customary international law's legitimacy and, in democratic countries,
democratic legitimacy, was a problem because through the use of custom, the international
community imposes legal duties on the independent sovereign in the form of mandatory
norms. The Court reasoned that while international law is ideally created by consensus, in
practice it rarely is. Yet it seemed to suggest that some of its concerns were mitigated
because Congress maintained the ability to limit the scope of the ATS, and therefore "the
statute ... is not a blanket delegation of lawmaking to the democratically unaccountable
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In applying Sosa, the Seventh Circuit examined the language of the
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 32(1); Minimum
Age Convention; and the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
Article 3(d) individually to determine whether each gave rise to a norm
of customary international law. The Court concluded that child labor,
with regard to all of the Conventions, was too vague and encompassing
1
a category to give rise to a norm of customary international law. 3
Firstly, it rejected the argument that the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child (1989), specifically Article 32 (1) gave rise to a
norm of customary international law. 104 The Article provides that
children have a right not to perform certain work, in particular that
which is hazardous, interferes with education, or is harmful to the
child's health. 105 The Court held that the language was too "vague and
106
Secondly,
encompassing" to establish a norm of international law.
the Court similarly rejected the Minimum Age Convention as a source
of customary international law. 107 This Convention forbids children
108
The
under fourteen from doing any work other than "light work."
the
of
because
norm
no
created
Convention
court opined that the
109
Lastly, in evaluating the Worst
vagueness of the term "light work."
Forms of Child Labour Convention, the Court noted that while it was
"more promising" than the other Conventions, it found that Article 3(d)
was "still pretty vague." 110 In particular, it enumerated three reasons for
its vagueness, namely: (1) its failure to specify a threshold of actionable
harm; (2) the "inherent vagueness of the words 'safety' and 'morals;"'
and (3) its provision that the domestic law of nations determines which

international community of custom creators." Id. Yet the Court noted concern that "[i]f [a
democratic country] has consistently rejected the international custom, it is possible for the
custom to apply to it." Id. Despite the court's concern, this last concern should be almost
completely mitigated by the persistent objector rule, in which a country that consistently
rejects an international norm will be considered a persistent objector, and therefore
exempted from the rule. See Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the
Utility of Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 221 (2010).
However, this is not the case for States that come into existence after the norm because the
persistent objector rule will generally not apply to them. Id.
103. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.
104. Id.
105. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32(1), Nov. 20, 1989
[hereinafter UNCRC].
106. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.
107. Id.
108. ILO Minimum Age Convention, art. 7, June 26, 1973.
109. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1022.
110. Id.
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types of work fall into Article 3(d). 111
The Court referred to the Convention's Recommendation 190 for
more detail on Article 3(d), but ultimately dismissed its importance
because a Recommendation "create[s] no enforceable obligation." 112
Here, the Court failed to consider whether the Recommendation, while
not binding on States, could help the Court to discern whether a custom
of international law exists, and if so, its scope. The Court also held that
the plaintiffs failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence of the
practices and customs of nations as to demonstrate that States perceive
that they have a legal obligation to follow the norm. 113
After this discussion, the Court found that "[g]iven the diversity of
economic conditions in the world, it's impossible to distill a crisp rule
from the three conventions." 114 Yet during this discussion, it was not
clear whether the Court based this opinion on a cumulative
consideration of all of the conventions, or whether it was based on its
analysis of them individually. A proper evaluation of the plaintiffs'
ATS claim would entail an explicit analysis of all of the sources taken
together, which would ensure that the Court addressed whether the
sources of international law give rise to a norm.
The Court concluded by enumerating a number of deficiencies in
the plaintiffs factual allegations. Specifically, the Court noted that it
was unaware of how frequently employees employed children to help
them fill their quotas; whether Firestone took effective measures to stop
children from working; how many children worked on the plantation;
the ages of those children who worked on the plantation other than
those who brought suit; how much work the average child did; and the
difficulty of the work. 115
The application of the Sosa standard aside, the Court's concluding
discussion was problematic.
The Court noted that its "biggest
objection" to the lawsuit was that it was unaware of "the situation of
Liberian children who don't live on the Firestone plantation." It
reasoned that the children who work on the Firestone plantation may be
111. ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, art. 3(d), Nov. 19, 2000, ILO No.
182 [hereinafter WFCLC].
112. Flomo , 643 F.3d at 1023.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1024. It was not clear why the Court required some of this information as
the Court did not fully explain its relevance. For instance, presumably had the Court found
that the employment of the children violated international customary law, it would not
matter how many children worked there. This is because the children who brought the
claim should be entitled to recover for the torts committed against them in violation of the
law of nations without reference to any other child employees of Firestone.
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better off than other Liberian children because their fathers are well paid
by Liberian standards. It continued by suggesting that they "would be
worse off if their fathers, unable to fill their daily quotas, lost their jobs
or had to pay adult helpers, thus reducing the family's income;" thus the
Court did not "know the net effect on their welfare of working on the
plantation."
This argument is paternalistic; completely undermines the
plaintiff's autonomy and freedom to decide what is or is not better for
them; and is a social, not legal, argument. While the argument may not
be wholly without merit, 116 any strain put on families is irrelevant in an
analysis of whether child labor constitutes a norm of international
law. 117 Further, if an employer violates customary international law, it
is logically perverse for a court to justify that human rights violation by
suggesting that the plaintiffs would be worse off if their human rights
were upheld. The Court's role here was to determine whether a norm of
customary international law existed, not whether enforcing such a norm
would benefit the very plaintiffs who presumably, having consented to
the suit, believed that suing the defendant was in their best interests.

3. Concluding Note on Prior ATS Cases Asserting Child Labor
Claims
While no plaintiff has successfully pied a child labor A TS claim
that has survived a motion for summary judgment, domestic courts
seem receptive to recognizing a norm of international law prohibiting
the forced labor and slavery of children under certain facts. In Nestle,
while dismissing the claim on other grounds, the court noted that it was
"clear that in some instances 'child labor' constitutes a violation of ...
international law." 118 Further, in Flomo, while the court found no
international norm proscribing "work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,

116. For instance, after plaintiffs served their complaint, Firestone adopted a "zero
tolerance" policy with regard to child labor whereby it would fire any employee found to be
employing the labor of a child. It is plausible that some workers or their families were
negatively affected by this policy. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Company, 2010 WL
4174583 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
117. The best argument for its relevance is that courts have noted that when
considering whether a norm of international law exists, the court must consider the practical
consequences of identifying a norm. Yet the practical consequences factor is limited to a
judgment about the "practical consequence of making that cause available to litigants in
federal court," and not the practical consequences to present litigants. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at
732.
118. Doe v. Nestle, 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
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safety or morals of children;" 119 it recognized that other forms of child
labor might be actionable. Specifically, it opined that evidence "that
[S]tates feel themselves under a legal obligation to impose liability on
employers of child labor... is readily available for the other types of
child labor listed in ILO Convention 182, such as. . . forced child
labor." Therefore, where plaintiffs overcome the procedural obstacles
posed by ATS claims and furnish sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that their employer engaged in slavery or forced labor, courts may be
receptive to their claim.
IV. A NORM OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
PROHIBITS SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR SUCH
THAT ATS CLAIMS BASED ON SLAVERY AND FORCED
LABOR SHOULD BE ACTIONABLE UNDER THE ATS
This section will argue that a norm of customary international law
prohibiting both slavery and forced labor has evolved within the
international community. 120 Taken together, the numerous treaties and
the practices of States demonstrate that the prohibition of slavery and
forced labor of children satisfy the ATS' s requisite elements, namely
that a norm be specific, universal, obligatory, and of mutual concern.
Further, this section will argue that children's status within
international law differs from that of adults, and therefore plaintiffs'
pleadings asserting ATS claims based on the forced labor of children
should address their unique status. In particular, plaintiffs should note
their conditions of labor. In doing so, they should direct special
attention to children's potential lack of capacity to consent to both
employment contracts and labor that will cause long-term mental or
physical harm. Also, pleadings should address children's potential
difficulty in asserting their own interests over that of an adult
supervisor. Further, these factors should be included in a court's
analysis of whether the conditions of the labor violated a norm
prohibiting child labor that is tantamount to slavery or forced labor.

119. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1023.
120. See Federico Lenzerini, Suppressing Slavery Under Customary Law, 10 ITALIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (2000) (providing a comprehensive history of slavery in international law,
as well as the contemporary state of customary international law regarding slavery, and
argument for the recognition of a norm of customary international law prohibiting slavery
and forced labor). Lenzerini argues that slavery has attained jus cogens status. Id. at 156.
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A. Specificity: Defining Slavery and Forced Labor Under
Customary International Law

Slavery and forced labor are specific norms whose definition can
be readily determined through reference to the relevant sources of
international law. The international community defines slavery as "the
status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised." 121 This definition
originated in the 1926 Slavery Convention and has not been subject to
great change. 122 The international community has reaffirmed this
definition in a number of main instruments dealing with slavery. 123
International sources, 124 as well as at least one domestic court in
an ATS claim, 125 define forced labor as "all work or service which is
exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which
the said person has not offered himself voluntarily." 126 While the treaty
excepts certain forms of labor from the definition, 127 the exceptions are
explicitly enumerated in the treaty and should not bar a court from
finding the specificity element satisfied.
In evaluating ATS claims, courts should treat forced labor as a
form of slavery. 128 Courts should distinguish between and evaluate
claims of traditional slavery and forced labor using these definitions.
Yet while distinguishable, these definitions are related, and courts
should recognize both as violations of customary international law.
B. Universal and Obligatory: The Prohibition of the Slavery and
Forced Labor of Children is a Norm Universally Practiced to
which States Accede out of a Sense ofLegal Obligation

Identification of a norm of customary international law requires a
finding that the norm is universally practiced and acceded to out of a
sense of legal obligation. 129 One element looks objectively to States'
121. Id. at 158-59.
122. Id. at 159.
123. Id. (citing to United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 7, April 30,
1957, 226 U.N.T.S.3 [hereinafter Supplementary Convention]; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 7, Nov. 10, 1998, U.N. Doc. NConf./183/9 (1998)).
124. See ILO, Forced Labour Convention, art. 2(1), June 10, 1930, ILO No. 29
[hereinafter ILOFLC].
125. Velez, 693 F.3d at 320.
126. See WFCLC, supra note 111.
127. See id. art. 2(2)(a)-(e).
128. See Lenzerini, supra note 120, at 165 (treating force labor as a modem variant of
slavery).
129. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131 (quoting Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233,
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practice, while the other evaluates States' subjective reasons for
engaging in that practice. The latter element requires that States
subjectively feel that they are legally obligated to practice the norm.
Yet the objective and subjective elements may be interrelated.
Specifically, a State may practice a norm as a result of a sense of legal
obligation to abide by it, or in the alternative, a sense of legal obligation
to engage in a practice may result from a State's preexisting practice
thereof. Because of this interconnection, this section will consider the
objective and subjective elements together.
C. State Practice: Evidence of the Universal Adherence to the
Proscription of Slavery and Forced Labor
State practice demonstrates that States universally prohibit
slavery. 130 The first national prohibition of slavery dates to 1794 in
France. 131 Many States followed. By 1957, States had ratified at least
300 international treaties suppressing slavery and the slave trade. 132
Following World War II, global condemnation of slavery and forced
labor continued and was expressed in the UN's human rights treaties
entered into after the War. 133 Today States universally prohibit slavery,
and slavery has been abolished in every nation of the world. 134 The
long history of the global prohibition of slavery left a lasting legacy in
the way that States and people understand slavery, "[R]eviving slavery
has remained beyond the bounds of any contemporary movement's
dreams or any [S]tate's ambition. Slavery rhetorically remains the evil
of choice for any movement or government that seeks to mobilize
sentiment against exploitative practices and coercive domination
anywhere in the world." 135

248 (2d Cir. 2003)).
130. This section is meant to demonstrate that today slavery is universally prohibited.
Therefore, the history provided is only meant to provide the reader with the most minimal
reference as to the antislavery movement's timeline.
131. Lenzerini, supra note 120, at 149.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 150.
134.
John D. Sutter, Slavery's Last Stronghold, CNN, available at
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/world/mauritania.slaverys. last.strongho Id/index. ht
ml (last visited Feb. 14, 2014) (noting that Mauritania was the last country to abolish
slavery, doing so in 1981; yet the practice was not criminalized until 2007).
135. SEYMOUR DRESCHER, ABOLITION: A HISTORY OF SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY
461-62 (2009).
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D. Treaties: Evidence that the Proscription of Slavery and Forced
Labor is Universal and Obligatory
The ratification of treaties serves as evidence of both objective
State practice and the subjective State belief in the obligatory nature of
a norm. Ratification serves as evidence of State practice in that States
are required to comply with the treaty norm. Further, by ratifying a
treaty States understand that they are legally bound by the treaty, which
satisfies the subjective element. The main treaties regarding slavery,
forced labor, and child labor have been ratified almost universally,
suggesting that almost all States subjectively feel that they are binding.
Further, their nearly universal ratification, in conjunction with the ILO's
status treating them as "core" treaties, demonstrates the development of
a norm of international law proscribing the slavery and forced labor of
children.

1. Treaties and Declarations Addressing Slavery and Forced
Labor
International treaties and declarations serve as evidence of the
objective practice and subjective belief of States with regard to the
prohibition of slavery and forced labor. In particular, the number of
ratifications of the main treaties involving slavery and forced labor
evidences States' universal subscription to the norm. Meanwhile, the
number of ratifications as well as the international community's
treatment of these treaties as "core" treaties evidence that States accede
to the norm out of a sense of legal obligation.
Sources of international law consistently demonstrate a universal
proscription of slavery in its traditional form. 136 The Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights recognize an affirmative right that "[n Jo one should be
held in slavery." 137 The International Covenant on Civil and Political
136. See Maria Fernanda Perez Solla, Slavery and Human Trafficking: International
Law and the Role of the World Bank, 6 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussionpapers/Labor-Market-DP/0904.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (citing United Nations, The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, Dec. 10, 1948 [hereinafter UDHR]; United
Nations, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8.1, Mar. 23, 1976
[hereinafter ICCPR]; European Court of Human Rights, The European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 4.1, Mar. 3, 1953 [hereinafter ECHR];
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 6.1, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ACHR]; United Nations,
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, art. 11.1, July 1, 2003 [hereinafter ICPRMW]).
137. UDHR, supra note 136, at art. 4; ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8.1.
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Rights 138 reiterates the right of individuals not to be held in slavery and
asserts a prohibition of slavery "in all of [its] forms." 139 It also goes
further and recognizes the right of individuals not to be subjected to
forced or compulsory labor. 140
Treaties proscribing forced labor have been widely ratified. Of the
most important treaties on this subject, the Forced Labour Convention
(1930), has been ratified by 177 States, 141 and the Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention (1957) has been ratified by 174 States. 142
The Forced Labour Convention defines forced or compulsory labor
as, "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the
menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered
himself voluntarily." 143 The Convention provides that ratifying States
must "undertake[] to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in
all its forms within the shortest possible period." Further, the
Convention requires States to criminalize forced or compulsory labor
for private actors. 144
The Abolition of Forced Labor Convention provides that ratifying
States "undertake[] to suppress and not to make use of any form of
forced or compulsory labour" under a number of circumstances
including when it is used for political coercion, education, economic
development, and labour discipline. 145 Further, States are required to
"take effective measures to secure the immediate and complete abolition
138. The United States, as well as 166 other States, has ratified the Covenant. ICCPR:
Chapter IV: Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS (Dec. 16, 1966), available at
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV
4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
139. ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8(1).
140. Id. at art. 8(3)(a), (c)(i) (providing exceptions to the definition of compulsory
labor).
141. Only eight States have not ratified the Convention. See ILO, Forced Labour
Convention,
May
1,
1932,
ILO
No.
29,
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11310:0::NO: 11310:Pl 13 lO_INS
TRUMENT_ID:312174:NO (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
142. Only eleven States have not ratified this Convention. See ILO, Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, Jan. 17, 1959, ILO No. 105, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=IOOO: 1131 O:O::NO::Pl 1310_INSTRUMENT_ID:3
12250 (last visited Feb. 14, 2014).
143. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 2(2)(1). But see, WFCLC, supra note 111, at art.
2(2)(a)-(e). (enumerating exceptions to the convention).
144. See Report III (Part IB): General Survey Concerning the Forced Labor
Convention, 1930 (No. 29), and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.
available
at
105),
International
Labour
Conference
5
(2007),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocume
nt/wcms_089199.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
145. Abolition of Forced Labour Convention art. 1, Jan. 17, 1959.
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of forced or compulsory labour." 146
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery explicitly
deals with an expanded notion of the conducts that constitute slavery. 147
The U.S., along with 122 other States, has ratified the Convention. 148
While fewer States are party to the Convention, it is still widely
supported and is useful as a vehicle to explore those practices that States
consider similar to slavery. It includes, but is not limited to debt
bondage, serfdom, and "any institution or practice whereby a ... young
person under . . . 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural
parents or by his guardian to another person ... with a view to the
exploitation of the ... young person of his labor." 149
2. Treaties and Declarations Addressing Child Labor
In recognition of the unique circumstances facing children, the ILO
specifically addressed the slavery or forced labor of children in the
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999). Since 1999, 174
States have ratified the Convention. 150 The U.S. was one of the first to
do so. 151 "[A]ll forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such
as. . . forced or compulsory labour" are included within the
Convention's definition of the worst forms of child labor. The worst
forms of child labor also include "work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health,
safety or morals of children." 152
To demonstrate the emergence of a norm prohibiting child labor

146. Id. art. 2.
147. United Nations, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art. 7, April 30, 1957, 226
U.N.T.S. 3.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, ILO, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-iii-2.pdf (last visited Feb.
5, 2014 ). This includes some of the most populous countries that failed to ratify the Forced
Labour Convention. Compare id. with /LO Countries that Have not Ratified this
Convention, ILO, available at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=lOOO: 1131 O:O::NO::Pl 1310_INSTRUMENT_ID:3
12174 (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). Specifically, the United States, China, Afghanistan, the
Republic of Korea, and Brunei Darussalam. See id. The only States to neither ratify the
Forced Labour Convention nor the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention are the
Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu. See id. This suggests that only those latter States are
not bound by the prohibition of child labor proscribed by each treaty individually.
151. List of Ratifications of International Labour Conventions, supra note 150.
152. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 3.
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that is tantamount to slavery or forced labor, reference can be made to a
number of other sources of international law. 153 While they have lesser
force, because either they are not binding or because the U.S. has been a
persistent objector, they should be consulted in conjunction with
binding sources of international law to demonstrate the emergence of a
norm of international law forbidding child labor that is tantamount to
slavery or forced labor.
These sources demonstrate a consistent concern about children's
participation in the workforce.
The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that employment that is
"harmful to [children's] morals or health or dangerous to their life or
likely to hamper their normal development" should be criminalized. 154
The Declaration of the Rights of the Child explicitly forbids not only
child labor before "an appropriate minimum age," but also forbids
"caus[ing] or permit[ing] [the child] to engage in any occupation or
employment which would prejudice his health or education, or interfere
with his physical, mental or moral development." 155 The Convention on
the Rights of the Child also requires that States take affirmative
measures to implement Article 32. 156 Specifically, it requires that they
provide a minimum age of employment, regulate employees' hours and
conditions of work, and establish sanctions for violations and
effectively enforce the laws regarding child labor. 157
In 1990, more world leaders gathered at the United Nations than
ever before to attend the World Summit for Children. 158 There, they
adopted a Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of
Children, as well as a Plan of Action, detailing the implementation of
the Declaration. 159 While the Declaration addressed a myriad of
concerns, in part it committed to "work for special protection of the

153. Solla, supra note 136, at 10 (citing ICCPR, supra note 136, at art. 8(3); ECHR,
supra note 136, at art. 4(2); ACHR, supra note 136, at art. 6(2); ICPRMW, supra note 136,
at art. 11 (2)).
154. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res 2200
(XXI), U.N. GOAR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI), at 10 (Dec. 16, 1966). The
United States is not a party.
155. Declaration of the Rights of the Child [hereinafter DRC], G.A. Res 1386 (XIV),
U.N. GOAR, 14th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/1386 (XIV), at 9 (Dec. 10, 1959). The United
States is not a party.
156. UNCRC, supra note 105, at art. 32.
157. Id.
158. A promise to children, UNICEF, available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/ (last
visited Jan. 29, 2013).
159. Id.
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working child and for the abolition of illegal child labor." 160 The Plan
of Action reaffirmed a number of obligations of the CRC and suggested
that all States should take steps to eliminate employment that is
hazardous, interferes with education, or is harmful to the health and full
development of children. Further, it suggested that States should seek
to protect children engaging in "legitimate employment" by ensurinfi
that they have the opportunity for a healthy and full development. 1 1
The Plan of Action urged specific contributions from States at the
national level as well as contributions from international development
agencies, regional institutions, all relevant United Nations agencies, as
well as others at the international level. 162
E. JLO 's Designation of Slavery, Forced Labor, and Child Labor
Conventions as "Core" Conventions

While the universal practice of the prohibition of slavery and
forced labor is evidence of State's perception that the norm is
obligatory, its obligatory character is also evidenced by the importance
afforded to the conventions by the ILO and its member States by the
conventions' designation as "core" conventions. That designation
suggests that the conventions have attained a status beyond merely
binding upon the parties and explains in part why states accede to them
out of a sense of legal obligation, namely because they protect
fundamental human rights. 163
The ILO regards the Forced Labour Convention, Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention, Worst Forms of Child Labour, and the
Minimum Age Conventions as 'core' conventions. 164 Core conventions

160. World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of Children,
UNICEF 1 7 (Sept. 30, 1990), available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/declare.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2014).
161. Plan of Action for Implementing the World Declaration on the Survival,
Protection and Development of Children in the 1990s, UNICEF 1 23, available at
http://www.unicef.org/wsc/plan.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) [hereinafter PAIWD].
162. Id. at 1134-35.
163. In 2000, the ILO's Director-General, Mr. Juan Somavia, commenting on the ILO
having reached 1,000 ratifications of its core Conventions, said, "[T]hese ratifications move
the world's workers closer to the day when the principles of these core labour standards,
which we consider as fundamental human rights, are enshrined both in international law and
in the domestic labour codes of all ILO member States." Press Release, ILO, ILO 'Core'
Conventions Ratifications Surge Past 1,000 Mark, ILO Press Release IL0/00/36 (Sept. 22,
2000),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/media-centre/pressreleases/WCMS _007909/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2013 ).
164. In fact, with only a total of eight Conventions designated as such, these
Conventions represent half of the ILO ' s core conventions. lnFocus Programme on
Promoting the Declaration, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION'S FUNDAMENTAL

Published by SURFACE, 2014

27

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 2 [2014], Art. 7

474

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 41 :2

are those "fundamental to the rights of human beings at work. .. [t]hese
rights are a precondition for all the others in that they provide a
necessary framework from which to strive freely for the improvement
of individual and collective conditions of work." 165
Distinguishing these conventions from others, the ILO seeks to
achieve global "basic human rights" and "decent work." 166
Accomplishing this goal requires the abolition of both forced labor and
child labor. Describing its inclusion of child labor within the core
conventions, the ILO recognized that children not only possess the same
human rights as their adult counterparts, but also a right to certain
measures of protection because of their age, inability to assert their own
interests, and lack of experience. 167
F. Mutual Concern: The Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labor
is a Norm of "Mutual Concern" among States

Beyond proving that a norm is specific, universal, and obligatory,
the Second Circuit also requires that States abide by the norm "out of a
sense ... mutual concern." 68 The slavery and forced labor of children
satisfies this element. Firstly, the international attention directed at
slavery, forced labor, and child labor through treaties and declarations
demonstrates that States are indeed mutually concerned about these
forms of labor. In Filartiga, the Second Cirucit held that States'
entrance into "express international accords" demonstrated that the
matter was of mutual concern to States. 169 Secondly, within our global
economy, labor frequently is a matter of mutual concern. While labor of
a strictly domestic nature continues to exists, 170 a great deal of labor is
international in nature, frequently dealing in products and services
within the international stream of commerce.

CONVENTIONS 8 (2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/- ed_norm/- -declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf (last visited Jan. 29,
2013).
165. Id.at?.
166. Press Release, supra note 163.
167. WFCLC, supra note 111, at 43. "Children enjoy the same human rights accorded
to all people. But, lacking the knowledge, experience or physical development of adults and
the power to defend their own interests in an adult world, children also have distinct rights
to protection by virtue of their age. One of these protections is from economic exploitation
and from work that is dangerous to the health and morals of children or hampers the child's
development." Id.
168. Flores, 414 F.3d at 248.
169. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888.
170. Interestingly, some of the exceptions to the Minimum Age Convention, discussed
below, are intranational, such as those who work in the home.
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In fact, the factual allegations of each ATS child labor claim to
date entails the mutual concern of States. In Ellul, plaintiffs alleged that
defendants engaged in child trafficking and then, among other
allegations, kept the children in circumstances constituting forced
labor. 171 These activities are international in character because they
involve the trafficking of children across nations' borders. Similarly, in
Doe v. Al Maktoum, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants trafficked
them to the United Arab Emirates as well as other Persian Gulf
countries from Africa. 172 Further, they alleged that defendants enslaved
them as child jockeys in Dubai and other areas, where forced labor was
exacted from them. 173 This conduct was international in nature because
defendants not only trafficked children to multiple countries, 174 but also
compelled them to work against their will. 175 While no detailed facts
are given about the camel races, it is not unlikely that they involved
patrons from all over the world, especially when they took place in a
city that attracts international business people and tourists, like Dubai,
suggesting that the children provided a service to patrons from all over
the world.
Firestone and Nestle involved multi-national corporations who
harvested and exported the ingredients for their products, rubber and
chocolate respectively, from the plantations on which plaintiffs worked.
Where multi-national corporations, which send their products to
numerous countries around the world, violate international law, their
conduct necessarily implicates the mutual concern of States. For
instance, the cost of labor in one country affects the cost of products in
another. In addition, the conduct of multi-national corporations may
affect international relations between States. Relations may be strained
if a corporation based out of one country does business in another,
exacts forced labor from its residents, and passes on the benefit from
such forced, and presumably cheaper, labor in the cost of its products
abroad.

171. Ellul, 2011 WL 1085325.
172. Id. Further evidence of its connection the mutual concern that this case posed is
that the defendants hold high political offices in the United Arab Emerates. Id. at 1133.
One of the defendants was both the Vice President and Prime minister of the United Arab
Emirates. Id. Another was its Finance Minister. Id.
173. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, at 1133.
174. An allegation that requires that defendant was involved in an international child
trafficking ring.
175. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1134.
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G. Application of the Elements ofForced Labor to Children's

Claims Warrants Special Consideration
Forced labor claims 176 merit special analysis in the context of
claims by children in light of the principles codified in international
agreements concerning child labor. Ensuring that employers do not
violate children's fundamental human rights poses unique challenges
which the U .N. has addressed in a number of treaties and covenants
previously reviewed. In particular, these international agreements
provide a framework within which to evaluate the last two of the three
elements of forced labor, specifically labor "for which the said person
has not offered himself voluntarily" and labor that "is exacted from any
person under the menace of any penalty." 177

1. Labor Not Offered Voluntarily and Children's Incapacity to
Consent to Employment Contracts and Work that Causes Harm
Whether workers enter labor agreements voluntarily merits special
consideration within the context of the child laborer. Plaintiffs may
contest children's capacity to consent to employment contracts, as well
as their ability to consent to work that causes mental or physical
harm. 178 International agreements recognize the right of children, as a
class, to certain forms of protection in part because the scope of their
ability to consent in certain situations is questionable.

2. Lack of Capacity to Consent to Employment Contracts
Minimum age laws are one way of determining the age at which
States recognize the capacity of the child to enter employment contracts.
To determine whether an international norm exists setting the
permissible minimum age at which a child may consent to an
employment contract, plaintiffs and courts should consult international
treaties requiring the adoption of a minimum age for employment, in
particular the Minimum Age Convention. 179
Since its founding, the ILO sought to regulate the minimum age of
employment. In fact, its agenda for its first General Assembly meeting

176. As previously noted, forced labor is "(1) all work or service (2) which is exacted
from any person under the menace of any penalty and (3) for which the said person has not
offered himself voluntarily." ILOFLC, supra note 111, at art. 2(1).
177. WFCLC, supra note 111, at art. 2( 1).
178. This may occur either directly, through harm directly caused by the labor; or
indirectly, through lost opportunities when the child forfeits other opportunities, in
particular education, to participate in the labor force.
179. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 108.
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in 1919 included the topic. 180 In 1959, the Declaration of the Rights of
the Child explicitly prohibited child labor before "an appropriate
minimum age." The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights suggested States should adopt regulations setting a
minimum age and violations of such laws should be punished. 181 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child reaffirmed this concern and
required that State parties adopt a minimum age of employment. 182
In 1973, the ILO reviewed the issue of the minimum age of
employment and expressed a renewed concern for it in the Minimum
Age Convention. 183 Since then, of the 183 members of the ILO, 165
have ratified the Convention. 184 The U.S. has not ratified the
Convention; nevertheless, its minimum age laws are fairly consistent
with the Convention. 185
The Convention requires ratifying Members to establish national
policies designed to eradicate child labor and over time to increase the
minimum age of employment "to a level consistent with the fullest
physical and mental development of young persons." The Convention
forbids the minimum age set by the State to be either lower than the age
of complletion of compulsory education or lower than the age of
fifteen. 1 6 Yet, in recognition of the child's economic role and lack of
available schooling, it recognizes an exception whereby "a Member
whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed
may, after consultation with the organizations of employers and workers
concerned, where such exist, initially specify a minimum age of 14
years." 187

180. PHILIP E. VEERMAN, THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND THE CHANGING IMAGE OF
CHILDHOOD 311 (1992). It also included the topic of employment that threatened children's
health. Id.
181. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 154.
182. UNCRC, supra note l 05.
183. VEERMAN, supra note 180, at 314-15.
184. Ratificaitons of C138- Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), ILO,

available

at

http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=I000:11300:0::N0:11300:Pl 1300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312283 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
185. Id. While the U.S. allows work at fourteen, which is inconsistent with the
provisions of the Convention, for the purposes of this paper what is relevant is that the
minimum age laws in the U.S. do not deviate from the laws set by other States by much.
The Fair Labor Standards Act sets the minimum age of employment at fourteen years of age
and limits the number of hours that children under sixteen may work. Youth & Labor,
DEP'T OF LABOR, available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/youthlabor/agerequirements.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
186. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 108, at art. 2(3).
187. Id. art. 2(4).
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The Convention also distinguishes between types of employment.
For work "which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried
out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young
persons," the minimum age is set at eighteen. 188 However, where
protections are in place for children under eighteen, children may be
employed in such occupations at the age of sixteen. 189
Certain types of work are excluded from the minimum age
requirements set in place by the Convention. The Convention exempts
work done by children "in schools for general, vocational or technical
education" and work done by children who are at least fourteen "in
undertakings, where such work ... is an integral part of' their education,
a training program, or program designed to help the child choose their
future occupation. 19 Further, members may choose to exclude limited
categories of employment from their minimum age requirements.
Despite this, the Convention forbids members from excluding work that
jeopardizes children's health, safety, or morals. 191
Child plaintiffs arguing that they did not enter into work
voluntarily should refer to the Minimum Age Convention and the
domestic laws of States to determine whether a norm of international
law exists recognizing their lack of capacity to consent to their
employment contracts. Because the Minimum Age Convention requires
ratifying Members to enact minimum age laws, plaintiffs would
strengthen their claims by demonstrating that States related to their
claim ratified the treaty. In so doing, they would demonstrate the
existence of a norm invalidating their consent to the employment
contract.
Specifically, reference to the Convention and to the domestic laws
of States provides greater insight into a norm concerning the minimum
age of labor. An ILO Report, Targeting the Intolerable, presented a
survey on the minimum age laws of 155 of the ILO member States. 192
It reported that while most States conformed to the minimum ages of

°

188. Id. art. 3(1).
189. Id. art.3(3).
190. Id. art. 6.
191. Minimum Age Convention, supra note 185, at art. 4(3).
192. International Labour Conference, 1998, Report VI(l) Child Labour: Targeting the
Intolerable,
86th
Sess.
at
24,
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/ 1996/96809 344 engl. pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2014).
Please note that it is not clear whether its review of the domestic legislation included only of
members who have ratified the Convention or all members. Also, this source is dated, and
therefore those making claims under the ATS may need to conduct an investigation to
ensure its information is up to date.
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labor imposed by the Minimum Age Convention, some fell below. 193 In
particular, thirty States permit children under fourteen to work, and six
of these States permit the employment of children as young as twelve. 194
This suggests that a norm of customary international law may have
arisen which would invalidate an employment contract between an
employer and employee below the age of twelve, at least for certain
types of labor. Because some States exclude certain sectors from their
minimum age requirements all together, this is not the end of the
inquiry. 195
To identify a norm, plaintiffs must be attentive not only to the
minimum ages set by the legislation of States, but also to the sector and
circumstances of their work or employment. The Minimum Age
Convention and many of its ratifying States distinguish between or
exclude certain types of work or employment from their minimum age
laws. 196 While this makes identifying a specific norm more difficult,
diligent plaintiffs may be able to identify a norm. For instance, while
States create exceptions for certain employment sectors, no state
excludes "industry." 197 Therefore, a thorough analysis of minimum age
laws and their exceptions suggests that at the very least a norm of
international law has arisen prohibiting a child under twelve from
consenting to an employment contract in the industry sector. 198

3. Lack a/Capacity to Consent to Work That Causes Mental or
Physical Harm
Numerous international agreements recognize that children have a
right to be protected from exploitation; a right that should make it
impossible for child laborers to consent to exploitative work. Various
treaties, including the ILO' s core conventions, emphasize children's
rights to development and protection from exploitation and harm.
Furthermore, the treaties not only require the recognition of this right,
but also a related right, a right to their own development. These issues
193. Id.
194. Id. In fact only thirty-three States have set a basic minimum age for admission to
any kind of employment or work, as required by the Convention. Id.
195. Id. (reporting that the most common exclusions include family undertakings (60
States); domestic service; employment in undertaking with a limited number of employees
(frequently 10); apprentices; the self employed; and in most States where a competent
authority exempts an employer (135 States)).
196. Report VI(l) Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable, supra note 192, at 24.
197. Id.
198. It is also possible that a more thorough analysis would actually put this age higher
if the States that permit 12 year olds to consent to an employment contract require a higher
minimum age for those children working in the industry sector.
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are related because frequently exploitation necessarily occurs at the
expense of development. Thus, within the discourse on the subject of
child labor, critics often cite the interruption of the child's education
and intellectual growth generally as short- and long-term
consequences 199 of such practices.
International agreements pay a great deal of attention to these
concerns.
The Geneva Declaration of the Rights of Children
emphasizes that children must be protected from all exploitation and
provided with the means for spiritual and physical development. 200 The
Declaration of the Rights of the Child provides that "[t]he child shall
enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and
facilities ... to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally,
spiritually and socially... in conditions of freedom and dignity." 201 The
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 202
( 1966) reiterates this concern for the exploitation of children: "Children
and young persons should be protected from economic and social
exploitation."203 The Convention on the Rights of the Child204 forbids:
199. While the child and the child's family suffer the primary consequences, the State
also suffers consequences from having its citizens' education and intellectual growth
artificially stunted.
200. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924.
201. DRC, supra note 155, at art. 2.
202. There are 160 States party to the Covenant. UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV 3&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). The United States is a signatory, but has
not ratified it. Id.
203 . International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 154,
at art. 10.
204. Ratified by 192 countries, more than any other convention. UNICEF, Convention
on the Rights of the Child: Frequently Asked Questions, available at
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30229.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2014). It has been ratified
by all states except for the United States and Somalia. Id. While the U.S. has not ratified it,
at least one source reports that the Obama administration had, at least at one time, sought to
reignite efforts to ratify the Convention. John Helprin, Obama Administration Seeks to Join
U.N. Rights of the Child Convention, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/23/obama-administration-seek n 2195 l l .html
(last visited Feb. 5, 2014). More importantly, it is most likely that the U.S. 's refusal to
ratify the convention is fueled by a fear that it will interfere with parental rights, and not its
position on child labor. Lawrece J. Cohen & Anthony T. DeBenedet, M.D., Why is the U.S.
Against
Children's
Rights?,
TIME
(Jan.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://ideas.time.com/2012/01 /24/why-is-the-us-against-childrens-rights/ (last visited Feb. 5,
2014). The Convention has gained such widespread recognition, that even non-state entities
have adopted it, such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army. Id. Yet because the U.S. has
refused to ratify it, the U.S. is characterized as a persistent objector to the treaty. Id.
Therefore, while it should be used as supplementary evidence that a norm of international
law has arisen regarding children and their right to be free of forced labor, a U.S. court is
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(1) the economic exploitation of children; (2) children from performing
work likely to interfere or be hazardous to their education; (3) and work
that is likely to be "harmful to the child's health or physical, mental,
spiritual moral or social development. " 205
The concerns enumerated in these Conventions should be
considered when plaintiffs claim that they did not voluntarily enter into
work. Children's ability to consent to work that harms them mentally or
physically is far more limited than their ability to consent to work that is
not harmful to their health. For evidence of this, plaintiffs should refer
back to the Minimum Age Convention to determine whether there is a
higher minimum age in place for the kind of work that they performed.
Upon a thorough analysis of these sources of international law,
plaintiffs may be able to identify norms of international law that limit a
child's capacity to consent to employment where the work is mentally
or physical harmful. While the specific articulation of such a norm is
beyond the scope of this paper, plaintiffs should carefully analyze the
conditions of their labor to determine whether the child possessed the
capacity to consent to the specific labor in which they engaged. Absent
consent, such labor can only be tantamount to forced labor.

4. Labor Exacted Under the Threat ofA Penalty and Children's
Difficulty Asserting Their Own Interests
The question of whether labor is exacted under the threat of a
penalty necessitates special considerations within the context of child
labor claims. Children, as a class and as individuals, may experience
difficulty asserting their interests over that of authority figures,
specifically adults. Without the ability to assert one's interest over that
of an adult supervisor, the child may engage in labor under the menace
of penalty in a wider variety of situations than would an adult.
International agreements recognize this potential danger and affirm
the child's right to protection from coercion and exploitation. 206 While
evaluating the factual context of forced labor claims by children under
the ATS, federal courts should be mindful of these two affirmative
human rights bestowed upon a child. They should recognize that
employers acting contrary to these rights are in violation of the child's
affirmative rights under international law.
Courts will need to
determine whether the employer exacted labor under the threat of a

unlikely to give it much weight in its analysis of whether such a norm exists.
205. UNCRC, supra note 105.
206. See discussion supra Section IV(C)(a)(i)(2) (titled Lack of Capacity to Consent to
Work That Causes Mental or Physical Harm).
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penalty, but claims should be actionable when a court does indeed so
determine, so long as the other elements of forced labor are satisfied.
Lastly, the elements of forced labor may be intertwined such that it
is unclear whether a child's labor was exacted under the menace of
penalty or not offered voluntarily. Under certain circumstances,
plaintiffs should dispute the validity of an employment contract on the
basis of the child's lack of capacity to consent to the labor. Yet the
definition of forced labor requires both that the labor is under the
menace of a penalty and not entered into voluntarily, so plaintiffs
should be sure to plead both elements clearly.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, child labor tantamount to slavery or forced labor
violates international law, and therefore plaintiffs bringing claims
alleging such conduct are entitled to recovery under the ATS. Because
of the procedural and pleading obstacles, claimants will continue to
have difficulty recovering under the ATS. Nevertheless, claimants are
more likely to succeed if they carefully plead the elements of a forced
labor claim, rather than if they rely strictly on the theory that child labor
violates the law of nations.
The elements of forced labor merit special analysis with respect to
the child claimant. Where possible, pleadings should specifically
address how the child's conditions of labor and lack of consent to labor
violate international law. Yet courts must also be careful to consider the
question of whether a norm of international law exists for a particular
claim, taking into consideration all relevant sources of international law
cited by the plaintiff.
Whether the risk of liability from an ATS claim currently deters
defendants from violating international law is a question outside of the
scope of this paper. If the frequency of ATS claims increases, a
deterrent effect may become noticeable. 207 Yet, this effect will be
limited to those persons who foresee the possibility of a U.S. federal
court maintaining personal jurisdiction over them.
While courts continue to shape the contours and scope of ATS
jurisprudence,208 it remains a powerful strategy for human rights
207. At least one author believes that potential defendants should be aware of the
possibility of ATS liability. See Anna A. Komikova, International Child Labor Regulation
101: What Corporations Need to Know About Treaties Pertaining to Working Youth , 34
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (2008).
208. For instance, just last year the Supreme Court held that where the conduct
underlying an ATS claim occurred outside of the U.S., the presumption against
extraterritoriality applies and claims must "touch and concern the territory of the United
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activists to ensure compliance with international law, and therefore a
possible remedy for at least some children who are victims of slavery or
forced labor.

States ... with sufficient force." Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1669. Yet the parameters of Kiobel
and what constitutes sufficient force is far from clear.
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